Introduction
Many contemporary theories approach international law-making with a shift in emphasis from the sources of law towards the communicative practices in which a plethora of actors use, claim and speak international law. Whereas earlier approaches would look at the sources as the singular moment of law-making, it is now generally understood that the broader process of speaking the language of international law contributes to its making. There are several main reasons for this shift. A first reason rests in the plain proposition that law not only lies 'in books' but also 'in action'. 1 Another reason for a move away from sources doctrine-at least as it has traditionally been spelled out-stems from the multiplication of actors as well as new forms and fora of lawmaking. A brief set of examples may clarify:
Consider, first, the distinction between 'combatants' and 'civilians', which lies at the core of international humanitarian law and which appears, among other places, in many different provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. But to know what the law is, we cannot but ask what it 'really' means to be a 'combatant' or a 'civilian'. And the answer to that inquiry cannot be found anywhere but in the practice of interpreting these terms. Their meaning does not lie in or behind the text of the Geneva Conventions, but is instead the product of communicative practices that uses these terms. And these practices are not limited to state representatives who sign international treaties, but they include the opinions of military advisers, case law from domestic courts, the jurisprudence of international (criminal) courts and tribunals, statements of the argued that the scope of its commitments could not simply increase due to 'temporal variations in language'. 3 The Appellate Body disagreed and held that the terms-'sound recording distribution services'-were 'sufficiently generic that what they apply to may change over time'. 4 The Appellate
Body decided a concrete case inter partes, but it is highly likely that its interpretation will carry onwards and instruct future practices. 5 Moreover, in some circumstances, trade agreements also 4 Ibid, para 396. 5 According to the Appellate Body, its reports create 'legitimate expectations' among WTO members so that panels are expected to follow its precedents. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8, 10 & 11/AB/R, 4 October 1996, p. 14. By way of introduction, these examples highlight why many contemporary theories see international law-making not as an act of signing an international treaty, but as a continuous communicative process of speaking and using the law. They also begin to illustrate the variety and multiplicity of actors who are involved in international law-making and, ultimately, they point to foundational questions: What is international law? Whereas the sources of international lawcommonly summarized in the revered Art. 38(1) of the ICJ Statute-reserve law-making to states, the legal discourse knows many other actors and legal normativity comes in many other forms than treaties, custom, or general principles. 10 Simply shifting emphasis towards communicative practices leaves a number of key issues unanswered. Crucially, it begs questions of foundations, of legitimacy, and of yardsticks for separating law from non-law. It poses core challenges to the concept of law. Sources doctrine has always been tightly bound up with thinking about the justification for the law and about its separation from other normative orders. The traditional narrative reads that international law is authoritative and distinct because it rests on the consent of sovereign states. Increasingly so, such International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with Relation to Articles 2, 5, and Annex 3 to the TBT Agreement, G/TBT/1/Rev.10, 1 January 1995, revised 9 June 2011. 8 Stephan 10 Cf. Chapter 3 in this volume (___ on 'actors and subjects').
a view is contrasted with approaches that seek to find a foundation in universal values or community interests. 11 The present contribution neither rehashes the traditional narrative, nor does it spend much time on renewed articulations of international law's justification or its separation from other normative orders. 12 Rather, the following sections discuss how theories approach international law-making with a focus on their shift towards communicative practices as a defining feature.
The contribution proceeds by sketching the move from sources to communicative practice against the backdrop of the 'linguistic turn', which proposes that law is made 'in action'
(II.). It then dedicates sections to principal contemporary theories, starting off with the New
Haven School as a pioneering approach to thinking of international law-making as a process of authoritative decision-making (III.). Its heritage is refined in the theory of transnational legal process (IV.). In contrast to these voices from New Haven, systems theory abstracts from the political strategies of concrete actors and is therefore in a good position to recognize law as an autonomous enterprise (V.). Practice theory then combines, first, sociological thought on the heels of Pierre Bourdieu in an attempt to overcome divides between actor-centered and structural approaches and, second, philosophical insights of pragmatism that refine accounts of how communicative practices actually make international law (VI.). Governance theory then suggests paying more attention to regulatory networks as sites of law-making and to private actors whose normative output gains bite on the market place (VII.). The concluding outlook discusses the Global Administrative Law project and research centered on international public authority as responses to the normative challenges stirred up by the multiplication of forms and fora of international law-making (VIII. Fitzmaurice similarly opined in a classic statement that 'texts must be interpreted as they stand, and, prima facie, without reference to extraneous factors'. 19 In short, interpreting and applying the law is understood as distinct from law-making, which, as a matter of sources, lies beyond the reach of the everyday operation of the law. That is a view that also Hans Kelsen ultimately upheld even if he otherwise foreshadowed significant theoretical developments. Three elements of his oeuvre are most salient for presenting the approach of contemporary theories to international law-making. First, Kelsen unburdened the concept of sources from much of its metaphorical and mystical baggage. In his view, sources are simply norms that authorize actors to create other norms. 20 With such an understanding in hand, sources can be found not only in Art. 38(1) ICJ Statute but at every level of the legal order. Art. 42 of the United Nations Charter is a source, for example, because it empowers the Security Council to adopt binding resolutions. More generally, whenever a norm is applied in any concrete case, it amounts to a source because it authorizes its interpretation. Second, interpretation is inescapably a creative activity that is not determined by the norm to be applied. The norm to be applied authorizes an interpretation but it does not determine the content of that interpretation. Kelsen critiqued orthodox judicial methodology for wanting to make believe that the act of interpretation is nothing but an act of understanding and clarification. The interpretation in any specific case (which amounts to a new norm for that case, the Fallnorm) cannot be discovered but only created. 21 In other words, there is 'no imperative without an imperatus'. 22 Every act of lawapplication is also one of law-making. 23 that applying a norm has on that same norm. Applying a norm produces a new norm for the concrete case, but it does not change the norm on which it is based. 24 
B. The linguistic turn: Lawmaking in communicative practices
Theoretical developments after Kelsen take his argument further by considering the feedback of applying a norm onto that same norm. They see the operation of the legal system not only as making law for concrete cases, but also as shaping the law to be applied. The main reason for this shift rests in the so-called 'linguistic turn', which disturbed received ideas about the relationship between words and the world-between language and reality. 25 Earlier, stability in the relationship between language and reality was thought to be provided by a connection between linguistic signs A parallel line of thinking takes off with Wittgenstein's piercing view that words do not have a meaning other than that attributed to them by their use. 29 In his solemn observation, the best that can be done is to observe and find rules that describe the use of an expression. The meaning of the explanatory rule is of course subject to the same fate so that one is caught in an 24 This is why Kelsen had such troubles in coming to terms with 'wrong' and yet effective interpretations. See András Jakab, 'Probleme der Stufenbaulehre' (2005) 55-132. and speaking (the law) the simultaneous presence of a transformation of the past and of the introduction of something new that reaches into the future. 39 The use of legal concepts shapes their content and develops the law in passing. Making law and interpreting it are not categorically different things, but law is made by way of interpretation.
C. Making law this way?
It might well be asked at this stage whether making law in communicative practices is not, after all, different from signing a treaty? Among other things, it could be argued that contracting parties intended later legal developments to unfold as they did. 40 This seems especially plausible when they used specifically vague language that includes terms that are 'sufficiently generic that what they apply to may change over time' and when they mandate institutions with supervisory (e.g. UNHCR) and adjudicatory functions (e.g. WTO). Later developments, it could be said, then only 'complete the contract'. 41 Four preliminary points are in order:
First, even if tied back to treaty terms or accepted formulations of customary international law, interpretative practice still contributes to shaping the contents of commitments. Why not call this law-making? After all, second, tying the communicative practice back to the consent of contracting states is oftentimes simply dubious and suggests that actors are clairvoyant. That parties to the Refugee Convention could have foreseen the expression 'membership of a particular social group' to include women is very unlikely. Third, using and speaking international law not only connects to past acts, which enjoy the blessing of sources doctrine, but actually re-structure the legal discourse by introducing new terms into the debate. 'Enemy combatants' are a case in 39 In further detail see the work of Jacques Derrida, in particular his Of Grammatology (Johns Hopkins University Press 1998) and of Judith Butler, in particular her Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (Routledge 1997). 40 On the distinction between 'contract treaties' and 'law-making treaties' and for a further discussion of the term law-making as opposed to creating specific (contractual) rights and obligations, see Catherine Brölmann, Adjudication had coined the 'primarily aimed at' standard and it was treated as if it was the expression used in the GATT. 42 But, fourth, whereas law-making by way of sources above all requires will, law-making by way of interpretation in principle has to convince. 43 But an additional last point is in order before doing so. Not all lawmaking in communicative practices comes in the form of interpretation. Many soft law instruments can connect to and re-shape hard law obligations. But they can also create normative effects on their own and, to the very least, shift argumentative burdens. Many global indicators do precisely that.
The fact that China struggles to undermine the World Bank's 'Doing Business Report' testifies to that reports relevance and impact. 46 Soft law can create forceful incentives for acting one way rather than another, sometimes backed by strong market mechanisms (think of voluntary product standards) or simply pull towards efficient co-ordination.
III. The New Haven School
The New Haven School groups a number of scholars who worked on a policy-oriented view on international law that was very outspoken about its disdain for thinking in terms of formal sources. 47 Reisman argued that scholarly teachings and judgments had developed a myth-the myth that international law could be found by looking at what Art. 38 ICJ Statute claims to be the sources of all law. 51 The model of positivism, he contends, is distorting precisely because it holds that law is made by the legislator. 52 Instead, Reisman maintains, international law emerges from the myriad of legal communications that a plethora of actors utter every day. In light of this observation, he developed a novel scheme, wholly unrelated to sources, that distinguishes legal from non-legal communications. 53 He notably finds that international law-making is not a function exclusively reserved for unitary sovereign states but is present in all legal communications. 54 Given that the international legal process is no longer dominated by governments alone, Reisman further finds that newly generated legal norms can conflict with norms that others might find with a formalist look at traditional sources of the law. His process-oriented view of international law transcends formalism and claims to be in a position of granting humanitarian concerns, voiced by a wide range of actors in international political discourse, a legal status even if they conflict with norms that have a formal pedigree in the sources of law. As in other sociological approaches to law, humanitarianism is construed as a social fact. It amounts to a point of reference for normative 50 judgment and for legal argument with a certain distance to positive legal provisions that might be spelled out in the UN Charter, for instance. 55 
IV. Theory of transnational legal process
The theory of transnational legal process (TLP), a spin-off from New Haven, shares the critique of legal positivism and formalism. It adapts the concept of 'jurisgenesis' from the work of Robert
Cover to look at the law-generating interactions among a multitude of actors rather than the formal sources of the law. 56 But this approach does not share the earlier New Haven School's 'conviction that if knowledge is properly put to the task of the realization of values, the results will lead inevitably to human betterment'. 57 In contrast, TLP does not, at least not at first glimpse, put international law in the instrumental service of given goals. Its chief architect and proponent
Harold Koh rather claims that the participation and interaction of the grand variety of non-state actors as well as the internalization of norms ensures the legitimacy of the jurisgernerative transnational legal process. 58 It remains opaque, however, why that should be the case. The main point of TLP appears to be its contribution to when, why and how international law induces compliance. 59 As an approach to understanding the making of international or transnational law it tends to be vague or simply mute. 
V. Systems Theory
The theoretical framework of systems theory paints a quite similar picture of law-making in communicative processes but it sets itself apart from policy-oriented jurisprudence à la New
Haven by remaining bound to understanding interpretation in law as a distinct enterprise that cannot be reduced to the exercise of power or the pursuit of values. It recognizes that speaking the language of the law compels actors to use certain arguments, a certain logic. It critiques external perspectives on legal practice for reducing legal practice to the logics of other systems such as political, economic, or cultural systems with their respective logic. Legal practice, in its view, then becomes indistinguishable-politics by other means. 67 One of systems theory's overarching propositions is that law is an autopoietic subsystem of society that encompasses all communications containing claims about (il)legality. 68 'Autopoiesis'
here is a term taken from biology which roughly means self-reproduction and it comes in handy for Niklas Luhmann to grasp the features of social systems. 69 The concept is used to suggest that communications within a system can only operate by reference to communications of that same system-legal claims have to refer to legal claims in order to be valid legal claims. 70 Legislationlaw-making through the channels of sources-can enter the legal system only by way of a 'structural coupling' between the political and legal system. In the domestic context this path is paved by constitutions. 71 In the international context this coupling portrays significantly different characteristics and the chances of input from the political into the legal system seen to be rather minimal, with two principal implications. 72 First, international law is understood to evolve in with domestic contexts, communicative operations in international law tend to portray more elements that would usually belong to other systems. In other words, international legal argument would show more references to morality and politics, for instance. 73 Furthermore, with specific regard to international law-making, the world society and international law are characterized by functional specializations rather than territorial delimitations.
Leaning on Eugen Ehrlich's sociology of law, Gunther Teubner points towards 'Global Bukowina', which are subsystems within the global society that create their own normative orders. 74 The overlaps with global legal pluralism as it has developed from TLP are evident.
Teubner argues that 'global law will grow mainly from the social peripheries, not from the political centres of nation-states and international institutions'. 75 And also in his outlook the role and impact of non-state actors is of increasing importance in societal law-making processes. 76 A feature to which systems theory draws specific attention is that society falls into distinct sectors that are institutionally organized in various regimes and driven by particular rationalities. 77 Law is fragmented along regimes that cater to the to economic or environmental interests, for instance. 78 With the conceptual move towards autopoiesis, Luhmann finds a fitting response to the challenges of the linguistic turn and the troubles of an infinite regress in the use of rules.
Remember, in the wake of Wittgenstein the question had been how it is possible to follow a rule if its use always depends on another rule, and so forth. The answer Wittgenstein gave was that rule following is a matter of practice. 79 Practice here is used in a manner akin to habit or custom. It is a cultural phenomenon of almost natural quality-practitioners acquire the ability to follow a rule in processes of socialization. 80 An actor must have learned in practice what a rule means-she must have use internalized the practice so as not to be in doubt about its meaning. 81 It may thus be deemed most fitting to think of norm change as a process of evolution, as systems theory does.
The 'blind force of natural selection' would change and make international law. 82 But the understanding of legal change as an evolutionary process, in a theoretical meaningful way, faces a number of obstacles. 83 One core challenge for such an understanding emanates already from Max Weber's astute argument: 'the mere change of external conditions is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain the changes in "consensual understandings". The really decisive element has always been a new line of conduct which then results either in a change of the meaning of existing rules of law or in the creation of new rules of law.' 84 It continues to be a task for theory to develop an account of legal change and law-making that captures legal interpretation as a distinct enterprise that is not reduced to politics, morality, or culture, on the one hand, and that still maintains a grasp on actual lines of conduct. A renewed conception of practice might be well suited to help meet that chore.
VI. Practice theory
Theories that give prime consideration to the concept of practice have for a while been mainly structuralist (and mainly Marxist The work of Pierre Bourdieu offers further inspiration for this line of theoretical thinking that explores practice between the snares of conduct that is oblivious to structural constraints and reified structures that exist independent of human action. Bourdieu argued that past structuralist approaches blunder into the trap of equating what they see as objective observation (unburdened with dealings of living persons) with the view that actors themselves have of their practice. 90 Social actors tend to be ignored where they should really be included as a constitutive element of the social world. On the contrary, however, only taking account of practice without any critical detachment and understanding for structural predispositions would fall for the fallacies of an unbroken subjectivism. Sociological insight would then be impossible. In other words, factors that explain conduct-an actors' legal interpretation, for instance -should not be equated with the reasons actors themselves see for their actions. Bourdieu developed his sociology in an attempt to overcome this divide with a praxeological epistemology. 91 A further source of inspiration may be found in theoretical pragmatism, especially in the work of Robert Brandom who, among other things, offers a persuasive response to the rulefollowing paradox (the infinite regress in applying a rule whose interpretation always hinges on yet another rule). Brandom argues that once an actor has consented to a rule, she has committed herself in relation to others to using certain concepts. The actual content of those commitments, the meaning of the concepts they use, is consequently the product of a process of 'negotiation' with others. 92 
VIII. Outlook: Global Administrative Law and International Public Authority
The complexity of forms and fora of international law-making below the radar of traditional sources doctrine poses significant challenges, not the least to the concept of law and to the possibilities of thinking in terms of sources more generally. 106 Moreover, the diversification of actors and institutions who can indeed exercise authority by contributing to the making of international law fundamentally challenges the traditional narrative of legitimacy of international law according to which international law exists and should be because unitary states have consented to it. 107 Contemporary theories converge on the fact that this narrative no longer holds.
For one thing, it does not hold because law is not fixed at the moment it enters the world through the channel of sources but is instead in constant making through communicative practices in which a variety of actors weigh in on the struggle for the law. 108 In addition, not everything that matters passes legally is necessarily connected to the sources of law. Soft law instruments and even such things as indicators, many of which only on the very first glimpse do not have a regulative governance effect. 109 While sources doctrine has tried to tie international law to the consent of unitary states because state sovereignty was thought to be the exclusive building block for legitimate international order, further complementary mechanisms of legitimation now need to be explored simply because sources do not capture everything that matters. 110 That is, finally, what the projects on global administrative law (GAL) and on international public authority (IPA) are about.
The GAL project has mainly been crafted as a response to growing accountability deficits in global governance processes, which are, above all, law-making processes. It is guided by the thought that those processes are best understood as administration and it defines global administrative law 'as comprising the mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative bodies'. 111 General principles of an administrative law character are introduced as a possible cure:
principles of transparency, procedural participation, reasoned decision, and review. With these procedural demands, the GAL project in effect takes on the challenge of offering a more dynamic approach to law-making. 112 Substantive standards-including proportionality, means-end rationality, avoidance of unnecessarily restrictive means, and legitimate expectations-further complement the procedural principles. 113 How to apply those principles and standards in concrete cases is a lasting question, not the least because, as the protagonists of the GAL project well realize,'[a]ccountability can dissipate effectiveness, participation can result in capture by special interests, transparency can mean populism triumphs over justice. ' 114 Research centered on international public authority likewise responds to legitimatory concerns with regard to the normative output of international institutions. It observes the transformations of governance and connects to the tradition of public law in its dual function of constituting as well as limiting public authority. 115 If public authority is understood as the law-based capacity to legally or factually limit or otherwise affect other actors' use of their liberty, then public law is precisely concerned with the tension between such authority and individual or collective freedom. 116 Making international law by way of interpretation and otherwise may well be captured as an exercise of public authority if actors have the capacity to establish their own statements about the law as reference points for legal discourse that others could only escape at a cost. Overall it seems that, in the current setting of global governance, not sources are the main site where law, politics and power meet, but the communicative practices in which a variety of actors struggle for the law. Attention and critique should be apportioned accordingly.
